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Abstract  
 
In modern,Western societies the purpose of schooling is to ensure that 
school-goers acquire knowledge of pre-existing practices, events, entities 
and so on.The knowledge that is learned is then tested to see if the learner 
has acquired a correct or adequate understanding of it. For this reason, it can 
be argued that schooling is organised around a representational 
epistemology: one which holds that knowledge is an accurate representation 
of something that is separate from knowledge itself. Since the object of 
knowledge is assumed to exist separately from the knowledge itself, this 
epistemology can also be considered ‘spatial.’ In this paper we show how 
ideas from complexity have challenged the ‘spatial epistemology’ of 
representation and we explore possibilities for an alternative ‘temporal’ 
understanding of knowledge in its relationship to reality. In addition to 
complexity, our alternative takes its inspiration from Deweyan ‘transactional 
realism’ and deconstruction. We suggest that ‘knowledge’ and ‘reality’ should 
not be understood as separate systems which somehow have to be brought 
into alignment with each other, but that they are part of the same emerging 
complex system which is never fully ‘present’ in any (discrete) moment in 
time. This not only introduces the notion of time into our understanding of 
the relationship between knowledge and reality, but also points to the 
importance of acknowledging the role of the ‘unrepresentable’ or 
‘incalculable’. With this understanding knowledge reaches us not as 
something we receive but as a response, which brings forth new worlds 
because it necessarily adds something (which was not present anywhere 
before it appeared) to what came before. This understanding of knowledge 
suggests that the acquisition of curricular content should not be considered 
an end in itself. Rather, curricular content should be used to bring forth that 
which is incalculable from the perspective of the present. The epistemology 
of emergence therefore calls for a switch in focus for curricular thinking, 
away from questions about presentation and representation and towards 
questions about engagement and response.  
 
 
Introduction  
In modern, Western societies schooling is almost invariably organised as an 
epistemological practice. Educational institutions present knowledge about 
the world ‘outside’ and for that very reason they rely upon a representational 
epistemology. This is an epistemology which holds that our knowledge 
‘stands for’ or represents a world that is separate from our knowledge itself. 
Since the object of knowledge is assumed to exist in a separate space from 
the knowledge itself, this epistemology can also be considered ‘spatial.’ In 
this paper we show how ‘complexity theory’
1 
has challenged the spatial 
epistemology of representation and we explore possibilities for an alternative 
understanding of knowledge in its relationship to reality. Our alternative 
takes its inspiration from complexity, Deweyan ‘transactional realism’ and 
deconstruction. With complexity we suggest that ‘knowledge’ and ‘the world’ 
should not be understood as separate systems which somehow have to be 
brought into alignment with each other, but that they are part of the same 
evolving complex system. This not only introduces the notion of time into our 
understanding of the relationship between knowledge and reality, but also 
points to the importance of acknowledging the role of the unrepresentable or 
the ‘radically non-relational.’  
 
 
We should make clear, however, that in pointing out the incompatibility 
between complexity and representational epistemology, we do not mean to 
suggest that we can do without representations in schools. All we are 
suggesting is that we need to review the meaning of our representations in 
the educational sphere, and hence the representational character of 
schooling. Our interest is primarily in articulating an epistemology that helps 
us think about knowledge, representation, education and the world that does 
not result in, or seek, closure. To put it differently, we are trying to articulate 
a different ethic or ‘way of being’ in education, that is less concerned with 
representing the real than it is with living it out in different ways.  
 
This is an argument more complicated than we will be able to develop in full 
in this paper. Nevertheless, we have begun to approach this task firstly by 
providing a very brief account of education as a ‘re/presentational’ practice, 
in order to make it clear what we are arguing against. Using perspectives 
from complexity we then show that all representations of complex 
phenomena ultimately betray their object (see Cilliers, 1998), and in doing 
this we address the question of what sort of epistemology is required if we 
would drop the conventional understanding of knowledge as reflecting or 
representing a pre-given world. We argue that complexity itself suggests an 
‘emergentist’ alternative to representational epistemology. This alternative 
comes close to Dewey’s transactional realism (see Biesta & Burbules, 2003). 
However it seems to lead to the more radical conclusion that because 
knowing is transactional, there will always necessarily be something that 
cannot make its appearance in the domain of representation. That however 
we order the world, there will always be more ordering yet to come. That 
there cannot be a notion of any final order. To conclude the paper, we 
suggest that this alternative to representational epistemology—which could 
be called an ‘emergentist’ epistemology— could lead to a different way of 
understanding educational practice since we find education (becoming 
educated) is no longer about understanding a finished universe, or even 
about participating in a finished and stable universe. It is the result, rather, 
of participating in the creation of an unfinished universe. 
 
Knowledge and Representation  
Before discussing our ‘emergentist’ alternative to representational 
epistemology, we need to clarify briefly what we mean by representation, 
since this is an extremely broad concept with an extensive philosophical past. 
We want to talk about representation in a fairly restricted sense. Firstly, we 
want to talk about this concept as something external and ‘public’ (see 
Hacking, 1983, pp. 132–133). In this regard we are excluding internal 
mental representations or thoughts. Secondly, we are restricting the concept 
of representation to include only those forms of representation that claim to 
be likenesses of the things they represent. This is because external or public 
representations can include anything that can be examined or regarded, 
including art-works that aim to distort or challenge conventional 
understandings of reality. But we also want to stretch the concept a little, to 
include not only physical objects like drawings, photographs, maps, films, 
tape-recordings, and scientific or other models but also elegant theories 
about electrons, gravitational forces, language and so on. Although one could 
argue that there is a difference between models and theories, we are 
purposely conflating these two concepts, since both, in our understanding, 
are representations which intend to help us understand the world as it really 
is. The purpose of both is to enable our movement towards a knowledge/ 
understanding of what the world is really like, once and for all. It is only 
when we use truth as a criterion to judge between alternative 
likenesses/representations (rather than, for example, usefulness), and when 
we understand truth to mean correspondence with reality, that we end up 
with an epistemology that can be called representational.  
 
In contrast to this representational epistemology—which could also be called 
a ‘spatial epistemology’ since it depends on a correspondence between 
knowledge and reality—we propose that complexity suggests a temporal 
epistemology which implies that the quest for knowledge is not in order that 
we may develop more accurate understandings of a finished reality, as it is. 
Rather, the quest for knowledge is about finding more and more complex and 
creative ways of interacting with our reality. Through doing this—through 
intervening in our own realities—we find out how to create more complex 
realities with which we can interact in yet more complex and creative ways. 
The point is that, from a complex systems perspective, there are no final 
solutions, only ongoing interactions leading to increasingly more complex 
interactions (and ‘solutions’). The key issue, for us, is that this is not how 
knowledge is commonly understood in Western educational institutions. 
 
 
Education as a Re/Presentational Practice  
Many if not most of our Western, modern educational practices and 
institutions seem to rely upon a representational epistemology (see Biesta & 
Osberg, 2007). What is significant here is, first of all, that they rely upon an 
epistemology rather than, say, a political, ethical or relational theory, and 
thus configure schooling in terms of the transmissions and acquisition of 
knowledge (there are, of course, some noticeable exceptions, particularly in 
the more radical forms of progressive education). Secondly, this 
epistemology is representational in that it is assumed that what is presented 
in education stands for something else: it stands for something in the world 
‘out there’, and therefore is a representation.  
 
 
One could argue that from a historical perspective educational practices were 
initially practices of presentation (see Mollenhauer, 1983). For long periods, 
new generations could learn through direct participation in existing ways of 
life, by mingling, competing and working with adults in the ‘real’ world (and 
in some cultures and settings this is still the way in which new generations 
learn). Mollenhauer argues, however, that in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century the position of children in society changed. What disappeared was 
the situation in which children were direct participants in life. What emerged 
instead was a separate sphere or educational world especially for children, 
where they could be educated for later participation in real life (this first 
happened for the elites and only by the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century for the masses). Mollenhauer’s claim is 
that it was only when a separate educational world was constructed, that the 
question of representation became a central educational question. After all, 
once we take children out of ‘real life’, but still want to prepare them for ‘real 
life,’ we need in some way to represent ‘real life’ within the confines of the 
world of the child. Since we obviously cannot get the whole world into the 
school, we have to select which forms of life to represent in the school. We 
must select what is valuable from what isn’t, and we must then represent 
this selection in appropriate sequences and formats. It is in precisely this 
respect that we would say that the central rationale for education is in terms 
of a representational epistemology: what and how best to represent ‘the 
world’?  
 
 
There are, however, at least two sets of arguments that, in a sense, 
challenge the idea of schooling as representation. First, there are arguments 
from the point of view of learning. The main insight—relatively old, but for 
some reason education needs to be reminded of it from time to time—is that 
teaching does not determine learning. What students learn may have a link 
with what teachers teach, but the two are not necessarily identical. Through 
their participation in educational practices learners learn much more and 
much different things than that which they were supposed to learn. This 
poses a challenge to curriculum makers. The argument from progressive, 
participatory and ‘situated’ learning theories is that the only way in which 
young people can learn meaningfully is if they can participate in ‘real world’ 
practices (see, e.g. Lave & Wenger, 1991). Representational curricula, it is 
argued, are disconnected from the things they wish to represent and 
therefore devoid of any real, significant meaning. The solution is therefore to 
do away with the ‘re’ and make educational institutions into places where the 
world itself is presented.  
 
 
However, against this ‘presentationalist’ or ‘participatory’ position it has been 
argued, firstly from a conservative viewpoint, that a ‘decent’ education is not 
merely about practical work or apprenticeship, but one in which children get 
access to all the great works of a particular cultural tradition. In this regard, 
even Dewey argued that schools should present a purified selection of the 
world (Dewey, 1966). Secondly, from a radical viewpoint, it is argued that 
participatory or presentational forms of learning end up in socialisation and 
adaptation and make it difficult to create critical distance and therefore result 
in one-dimensional ways of learning. In this way ‘representational’ and 
‘presentational’ pedagogies are somewhat (although not completely) opposed 
to each other—although both strategies are still the two main approaches to 
education, and perhaps becoming increasingly intertwined (see Biesta & 
Osberg, 2007).  
 
But there is another argument that challenges the idea of representation. 
This argument challenges both presentation and representation and therefore 
opens the possibility of thinking about education in a way that gets away 
from the intertwined presentation/representation approach. This argument is 
supported by the work of Jacques Derrida—in particular his critique of ‘the 
metaphysics of presence,’ more familiarly known as ‘deconstruction’—which 
can be substantiated by arguments from complexity theory (see Cilliers, 
1998). According to this line of thinking, both presentational and 
representational pedagogies rely upon the idea of a world that is simply 
present and can simply be represented. Derrida would argue that both 
presentation and representation are examples of the ‘metaphysics of 
presence’—the idea that there is a world ‘out there’ that is simply ‘present’ 
and to which all our understandings (meanings) are in relation. In contrast to 
this position, deconstruction resists being drawn into and subsumed by any 
relationship with presence. While deconstruction certainly offers some 
interesting perspectives on education (see Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2001, for a 
general overview; and Ulmer, 1985, and Biesta, 2004, for a discussion about 
deconstruction and educational [re]presentation), we believe that by 
challenging both representation and presentation, complexity also offers a 
way out of the dilemmas in the representational approach to education. 
Complexity’s Challenge to Representation  
Complexity’s challenge to representation comes from the idea that models of 
complex systems appear not to be representations in the usual sense of the 
word. They cannot be understood to ‘stand for’ or depict reality as it really is. 
There is no isomorphism between the world and our descriptions of it. We 
would argue that this is also the case with scientific theories which attempt 
to reduce the world to a system of rules or laws. This challenge to 
representation, we believe, does not imply that we should attempt to do 
without representations, but that we need to rethink the status and the 
purpose of our representations.  
 
 
The idea that complex models are not isomorphic with the complex systems 
they purport to represent has been defended in detail by Cilliers (1998, 
2001). In a nutshell, the argument is that since we cannot understand 
something complex in all its complexity (as humans we have limited means 
and limited time), models, by definition, have to reduce complexity. It is 
exactly in this reduction that we generate understanding. A model must 
necessarily be simpler than the thing modelled. Complex systems, however, 
are by definition ‘incompressible’: they cannot be ‘reduced’ without losing 
something (Cilliers, 1998, pp. 7–10). This, in fact, is the criterion that can be 
used to distinguish complex systems from those that are merely 
‘complicated’ (a distinction that, although useful, is not unproblematic: see 
Cilliers, 2000b). Complex systems cannot be reduced, because of the non-
linear nature of their interconnections. The information they contain is not in 
the individual elements making up the system, but distributed in their 
pattern of interactions. This means that if we leave anything out of the 
system (which we have to do if we want to make a model) we disrupt the 
information contained in the system. What is more, the elements left out 
have non-linear relationships with the other elements, and we cannot 
therefore predict the magnitude of the effects this will have in a deterministic 
way.  
 
 
This point can be expanded to general theories which aim at understanding 
the universe by reducing its processes to a system of rules or laws. Although 
our understanding is a result of a reduction (of a distributed set of 
relationships to a discrete set of rules), this reduction is by definition flawed, 
and therefore our understanding of complex phenomena is never perfect. We 
can have different models of the same system, but the understanding 
generated is always a function of the specific model chosen, and there is no 
meta-model that does this work for us. The choice of models is not 
arbitrary—some work better than others—but we cannot claim that they are 
chosen objectively. Understanding, and the model which generates that 
understanding, go hand in hand (see also Cilliers, 2000a).  
 
We can therefore argue that models and theories that reduce the world to a 
system of rules or laws cannot be understood as pure representations of a 
universe that exists independently, but should rather be understood as 
valuable but provisional and temporary tools by means of which we 
constantly re-negotiate our understanding of and being in the world. We use 
the term re-negotiate (rather than the term negotiate) because we hold that 
the process of negotiating our world does not have an end: rather, it results 
in the creation of a new and different and sometimes more complex world. In 
this way our negotiations are always already re-negotiations; they are 
temporary by nature.  
Rules and Boundaries in Complex Systems  
To use models to get to the answer that our theories are not representations 
but re-negotiation tools, we first have to be clear about the fact that both 
models and theories about complex systems are well framed, receive specific 
inputs and produce specific outputs, and can therefore be considered as 
closed systems with well-defined boundaries. In contrast, the natural 
complex systems that we are interested in modelling—such as language, life, 
economic systems, ecosystems, education, consciousness, and so on—do not 
have clearly defined boundaries. This difference has an impact on the way in 
which rules operate in these systems.  
 
 
What is of significance here is that from the fact that models of complex 
systems can be reduced to rules, it is sometimes inferred that natural 
complex systems can be reduced to rules (two examples of this kind of 
inference can be found in Holland, 1998 and Wolfram, 2002, but there are 
many other examples in the complexity literature). But in fact the only 
reason rules work in models is because models have well defined boundaries. 
For example, in a ‘closed’, non-linear system such as a cellular automaton, 
where all the initial conditions are very precisely known, and presuming the 
principle of causality holds, there is only a single trajectory which this system 
can follow, and the operating rules sharply determine this trajectory. The 
very same trajectory will be followed every time we have a particular set of 
initial conditions and rules. The system will produce the same effects time 
and again, and in this way we can say the output of the system can be 
accurately represented in terms of the operating rule plus the initial 
conditions of the system. Our point is that although this may be the case 
with closed systems (that is, our models and theories), the problem lies in 
extending such an understanding to natural complex systems, which are 
open systems, having boundaries that are not clearly defined.  
 
 
In open systems that interact with their environment and that have 
interconnections which extend not only internally and between systems, but 
also across different hierarchical levels, complex behaviour is not so easily 
reduced to a system of rules. If we assume rules do indeed govern the 
behaviour of such systems, this would mean that different rules of operation 
would criss-cross in ‘individual’ complex systems. So the behaviour of any 
particular system is contingent on many different and overlapping sets of 
rules (which themselves are emergent products of other interacting complex 
systems). The problem therefore becomes one of how we can describe or 
represent or theorise a system like this in terms of a single or unified set of 
rules. The question is how we can represent the behaviour of the system in 
terms of a set of rules when its output is partially determined by sets of rules 
to which we have no access (see Cilliers, 2000b, 2001).  
 
This is not to say we cannot model or theorise radically contingent systems 
by looking for their rules of operation. Obviously we can and do, and often 
successfully, although within limits (e.g. the weather). But we have to 
acknowledge that to model or theorise any interconnected system we first 
have to cut it off from the other regularities or systems with which it 
interacts. We cannot pretend this is not the case. We need boundaries 
around our regularities before we can model or theorise them, before we can 
find their rules of operation, because rules make sense only in terms of 
boundaries. The point is that the setting of the boundary creates the 
condition of possibility for a rule or a law to exist. When a boundary is not 
naturally given, as is the case with natural complex systems, the rules that 
we ‘discover’ also cannot be understood as naturally given. Rules and ‘laws’ 
are not ‘real’ features of the systems we theorise about. Theories that 
attempt to reduce complexity to a system of rules or laws, like our models 
which do precisely this, therefore cannot be understood as pictures of reality.  
Representational versus Functional Correspondence  
We still, however, have to get from this idea—that models and theories that 
reduce complexity to a handful of rules are not pure ‘representations of 
reality’—to the idea that they are instead provisional, helpful tools by means 
of which we renegotiate our world. We can start with the following question: 
if our models of complex systems do not reflect reality exactly, why does 
their behaviour appear to correspond with the behaviour of the system 
(reality) we are modelling? There are at least two perspectives from which 
this question can be answered.  
 
 
First, we could take the traditional perspective that our model represents 
some real pattern or regularity (albeit a radically interconnected regularity) 
that actually exists and that all we have done is separate this regularity from 
‘reality at large.’ If we look at the situation like this, we see that if we were 
to try and represent the behaviour of an isolated ‘regularity’ in terms of its 
rules of operation, we would find that the overlapping sets of rules that made 
the regularity behave in the way it did within the larger interconnected 
system are no longer accessible to us. If we want our model to behave in the 
way the interconnected regularity behaved, we have to find not only a new 
set of rules, but also a new set of initial conditions for these rules to operate 
upon. And because our model has a boundary, such new rules and initial 
conditions can be found/named. However, the rules and initial conditions that 
make our isolated model behave like the interconnected regularity cannot be 
understood to be isomorphic with the rules operating in the interconnected 
regularity. The rules of our model may produce the same effect as the 
interconnected regularity, but it is a completely different set of rules and 
initial conditions that creates this effect. In other words, regularities exist, we 
can detect them and even find rules that reliably describe their behaviour, 
but the rules we find are pragmatic, they are not real things, they are not 
pure reflections of reality. There is no isomorphic relationship between the 
rule in the model and the rule in the real system (if such ‘real’ rules even 
exist). While our models may imitate or simulate the behaviour of an 
observed regularity (at least for a while), and in this way appear to 
correspond to reality, we must acknowledge that this correspondence is not 
representational (or isomorphic) but functional or pragmatic. The ability to 
explain carries little warrant of truth. Our models are tools, not pictures of 
reality. For exactly the same reasons, theories which attempt to represent 
natural complex systems in terms of a few rules or laws can also not be 
understood to reflect the ‘real’ world. Like our models, these theories are 
pragmatic. They are tools. However, acknowledging that models and theories 
are tools rather than representations still doesn’t get us to the point where 
we can say that models and theories are tools that help us re-negotiate our 
world. To do this we need to switch perspectives.  
 
 
A different way of understanding knowledge—and here we draw on Hacking 
(1983)—is to say that we don’t first ‘see’ the regularity and then try to 
describe it by means of a set of rules (which don’t really exist) in order to 
understand it (which would be a rather futile operation, to say the least). 
Rather we infer the existence of a regularity from the nature of our 
interactions with our environment. For example, we can infer the existence of 
negatively charged electrons because we can do things with them. We can 
use them to find out something else.
2 
However, the purpose of interacting 
with our environment is not simply to discover what the real world is like, but 
to find ways of manipulating our environment, so that we can live in it and 
change it. It is only through experimenting with our environment— 
interacting with our world—that knowledge emerges. We ‘gain knowledge’ 
not from passively observing, but from actively intervening, or, as Francis 
Bacon aptly put it, by ‘twist[ing] the lion’s tail’ (quoted in Hacking, 1983, p. 
246). From this perspective, knowledge is not about ‘the world’ as such, it is 
not about truth; rather, it is about what we can do in the world, how we can 
change it. The former understanding leads us to believe that ‘the phenomena 
revealed in the laboratory are part of God’s handiwork, waiting to be 
discovered’ (Hacking, 1983, p. 225), and our models/ theories are reflections 
of this world. The latter, on the other hand, suggests that any phenomena 
that are ‘revealed’ are secondary effects of our transactions with our 
environment, and our models/theories are placeholders that allow us to 
develop more complex understandings, which in turn enable us to re-
negotiate a reality that is becoming increasingly complex as a result of our 
interventions. We can never ‘catch up’ with this reality, for each time we 
make a move in this direction, we create a more complex situation for 
ourselves. One could say ‘acquiring’ knowledge does not ‘solve’ problems for 
us: it creates problems for us to solve. This represents a significant shift.  
 
 
We are asked to shift from a spatial or representational understanding of 
knowledge to a temporal understanding of knowledge, where knowledge has 
to do with the relationship between our actions and their consequences. With 
the latter understanding there is a split in time rather than in space (that is, 
the split between mind and world) and so we could call this a temporal rather 
than a spatial epistemology (see Biesta & Burbules, 2003, for details about 
such a temporal understanding of knowledge and truth). This temporal 
understanding of knowledge meshes with the idea that our models and 
theories are not representations of the world as such, but functional or 
pragmatic tools which enable us to interact with the world in more complex 
ways. In other words, through experimenting with our world, we are led to 
certain realisations about it which enable us to interact with it differently. 
This in turn leads to more complex realisations about our world, which may 
replace those held previously, and so the cycle continues. Through this never 
ending process of experimenting and rethinking we are able to continuously 
re-negotiate our own theories, and thus we re-negotiate our position in the 
world. 
 
Complexity’s Challenge to Presentation  
We have said that complexity asks us to make a shift from a spatial or 
re/presentational epistemology to a temporal epistemology. This shift, we 
believe, brings us to the issue of complexity’s challenge to presentation. To 
make this clear we shall review the special way in which complexity 
understands temporality.  
Linear versus Non-Linear Understandings of Temporality  
Complexity’s understanding of temporality and process contrasts with linear 
understandings which assume that processes (causal sequences of events) 
happen over time and so can be understood from particular temporal 
standpoints (with no temporal standpoint being privileged). With this 
understanding, time is just another variable or parameter that can be applied 
to the system from without. From a complex systems perspective, however, 
temporality is not a static variable but an operator—functioning from within, 
an integral part of the structure of the system itself. In other words, 
structure and process are inseparable. This is illustrated by the concept of 
emergence, where we find that first, we cannot talk about one set of 
structures being ontologically prior to and therefore simply ‘giving rise to’ 
another hierarchical level of structures, as is the case with a linear 
understanding of process. With emergence, if the higher (or emergent) level 
consists of units of the lower level, then they exist simultaneously (Emmeche 
et al., 1997). Second, we find that emergent features constrain the space of 
possibilities simply by manifesting (ibid.): this is precisely because they exist 
simultaneously with lower level components. In this sense emergent effects 
must be understood as being imprinted on the lower level components. This 
sort of ‘process’ ensures that a complex system has an irreversible trajectory 
and, more than this, this directionality or historicity is part of the information 
contained in the very structure of the system itself. It cannot be taken out of 
the system without destroying the system, which is why structure and 
process are inseparable in complex systems. The question is, how does this 
‘emergentist’ understanding of time/process affect our understanding of 
knowledge?  
A Complexity Informed Understanding of Knowledge  
Before articulating what knowledge could mean from a complex systems 
perspective, we first need to reiterate that conventional (that is, 
representational or spatial) understandings of knowledge create a divide 
between the mind and the world, or between the world and our knowledge of 
it. Again, we refer to it as a ‘spatial’ understanding because knowledge is 
assumed to be ‘in the mind’ while the object of this knowledge is assumed to 
be ‘out there’ in a different place. This understanding of knowledge, however, 
leaves us with the problem of needing some way of checking that our 
knowledge or representations of the world correspond to the real world. 
However, we find we can never be sure that our representations correspond 
to the real world because every test of our representations simply results in 
more representations. To attempt to argue for realism at the level of 
representation is to be locked into a world of representations.  
 
 
Dewey solves this problem by understanding knowledge and learning in 
terms of action or, more accurately, transaction (Dewey & Bentley, 1949; 
Biesta & Burbules, 2003). Although this introduces the dimension of time into 
our conception of knowledge, it is important to be precise about the temporal 
character of Dewey’s understanding of knowledge. Dewey’s point is not 
simply that learning takes time and that we learn about ‘the world’ through 
the effects of our actions. If this were the case we could simply replace the 
idea of knowledge as a comparison between places (mind and world) with 
the idea of knowledge as a comparison between events (before and after). 
The key insight in Dewey’s transactional theory of knowing is that the world 
that comes ‘into focus’ through our transactions is not a world that is simply 
‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, since this would imply that there is an 
end to our knowing when the world is perfectly in focus. In fact transaction 
never stops and hence ‘the world’ never stops coming into focus. The 
continuing appearance of reality, in more and more complex guises, one 
could say, is an effect of our interacting in the world, not the starting point.  
 
 
This situates Dewey’s perspective very much within a complex systems 
framework. In the vocabulary of complexity we could say that knowledge 
emerges from our transactions with our environment and feeds back into this 
same environment, such that our environment becomes increasingly 
meaningful for us. This means we cannot have knowledge of our 
environment, once and for all—it is not something we can see, something to 
look at. Rather, it is something we have to actively feel our way around and 
through, unendingly. Why unendingly? Because in acting, we create 
knowledge, and in creating knowledge, we learn to act in different ways and 
in acting in different ways we bring about new knowledge which changes our 
world, which causes us to act differently, and so on, unendingly. There is no 
final truth of the matter, only increasingly diverse ways of interacting in a 
world that is becoming increasingly complex.  
 
Although we don’t have the space to develop this idea here, we believe that 
the way in which complexity understands the notion of knowledge is 
congruent with Dewey’s transactional realism, and this helps put the 
observer back in the world as an interested participant rather than a 
disinterested observer. To put it differently: a ‘complexity based’ 
understanding of knowledge helps us towards an ‘emergentist’ epistemology 
in which ‘the world’ and our ‘knowledge’ of it are part of the same complex 
system (rather than being two separate complex systems, which we 
somehow need to get into alignment). But a similarity with Dewey’s 
transactional realism is not the end of the story for the epistemology of 
complexity. There is a further aspect which needs unravelling, and this is 
complexity’s relationship with the radically non-relational.  
Knowledge and the Radically Non-relational  
Dillon (2000) has suggested that both complexity and poststructuralism 
understand the world as ‘radically relational’, but that these two positions 
differ from each other in terms of their understanding of this ‘radical 
relationality’. In his words:  
 
For complexity thinkers the anteriority of radical relationality is just 
that, the anteriority of radical relationality ... . For poststructuralists 
the anteriority of radical relationality is relationality with the radically 
non-relational. Here the radically non-relational is the utterly 
intractable, that which resists being drawn into and subsumed by 
relation, albeit [that] it transits all relationality as a disruptive 
movement that continuously prevents the full realisation or final 
closure of relationality, and thus the misfire that continuously 
precipitates new life and new meaning. There is no relational 
purchase to be had on the intractable. It resists relation. (Dillon, 
2000, p. 5)  
 
However, in contrast to Dillon, we believe that complexity is not oblivious to 
the ‘radically non-relational’. Quite the contrary: ‘relationality to the radically 
non-relational’ could be considered key to the logic of complex systems.
3 
This 
is evident in Prigogine (1997), who insists that although new order 
(emergence) results when a complex system explores and finds new ways of 
working with the initial conditions, and that these initial conditions are 
provided by the lower hierarchical level—and are ‘causal’ in this regard—the 
elements making up the lower level do not provide everything necessary for 
order of a particular kind to emerge at the higher level. In his words:  
 
The system ‘chooses’ one of the possible branches available when far  
from equilibrium. But nothing in the macroscopic equations justifies 
the preference for any one solution. (Prigogine, 1997, p. 68, italics 
added).  
 
The single actualised version—the ‘solution’ that is ‘chosen’ by the system—is 
always one among a number of plausible alternatives that happened not to 
occur. This means that the ‘solution’ a system will finally ‘settle on’ is not a 
foregone conclusion, but always a matter of chance. To put this another way, 
the pattern (or organisation) that emerges at the higher level is not only a 
product of the system’s relational past but also of ‘something’ that is not 
present in the system at all. The combination of the system’s relational past 
with the totally intractable or unrepresentable to produce new emergent 
order that supervenes on lower levels ad infinitum ensures that the system is 
never in a state where it is fully actualised, is never fully ‘present’ at any 
point in time, because an integral part of it is that which is not part of it. It 
therefore remains always in the process of becoming without being (see 
Osberg & Biesta, 2007, for a more detailed account). This understanding of 
emergence comes close to key insights, developed by Derrida under the label 
of ‘deconstruction’.  
 
In describing the poststructuralist perspective, Dillon comments,  
 
for poststructuralist thinkers, not only is there more to life than 
meets the eye, that ‘more’ is never something that will ultimately 
make its appearance in the domain of representation. It is the 
intractable always already at work within but resistant to 
representation. Its presence-as-absence spoils the show for 
representation since it is always already subverting representation’s 
productions. (Dillon, 2000, p. 15)  
We believe this is also the case for complexity. Chance is always already at 
work in complex systems, thereby spoiling the show for representation. 
 
Implications for Schooling  
In this paper we have explored issues of representation and presentation, 
using complexity theory, Deweyan transactional realism and deconstruction. 
We have shown how complexity theory challenges the idea and possibility of 
representation, partly through the idea of incompressibility and partly by 
showing the problem of attempting to represent open systems (reality) by 
closed systems (representations, models, theories). The upshot of this is not 
that we should no longer attempt to develop knowledge, models, or 
theories—but that we shouldn’t think of them as ‘copies’ of the world ‘out 
there’. Rather, we should understand knowledge, models and theories as 
tools that we use in engaging with ‘the world’. This suggests an epistemology 
in which time has a central role to play—a temporal rather than a spatial 
epistemology.We have pushed this argument one step further by also 
problematising the idea and possibility of ‘presentation’ and ‘presence.’ The 
main step here was to see that time is not a static variable unaffected by 
systems, but rather an operator in the system itself. By using this line of 
thinking, and combining it with some insight from Dewey and deconstructive 
ideas, we suggested that complex systems can only be understood if we 
acknowledge the ‘presence’ of something that cannot be presented, that can 
never become ‘present’. Here, as we suggested, our explorations came close 
to key insights developed by Derrida under the label of ‘deconstruction’. 
Along these lines we have tried to show that complexity theory not only 
problematises conventional—i.e. representational—ways of thinking about 
knowledge in relation to reality. We have also tried to show that it is possible 
to develop an alternative ‘epistemology’ using key ideas from complexity. In 
this process we found it helpful to refer to the work of Dewey, whose 
temporal theory of knowledge and whose transactional ontology show a 
surprising affinity with ideas emerging from complexity theory and 
deconstruction. Rather, therefore, than thinking of knowledge as the 
representation of a world that is somewhere present in itself, our 
considerations suggest an ‘emergentist’ epistemology in which knowledge 
reaches us not as something we receive but as a response, which brings 
forth new worlds because it necessarily adds something (which was not 
present anywhere before it appeared) to what came before.  
 
 
The challenge then is to see what this alternative ‘emergentist’ 
epistemology— which we may no longer even want to call an epistemology—
would imply for the practice of schooling. What would schooling actually look 
like if we dropped the idea that its overall aim is to ensure the acquisition of 
knowledge of an already existing reality that is fully present? How might such 
a practice of schooling actually be ‘performed’? Such questions, according to 
Ulmer (1985), open a search for a ‘non-magisterial’ style of teaching. When 
we consider the purpose of schooling in terms of an emergentist 
understanding of knowledge and reality, we must begin to imagine schooling 
as a practice which makes possible a dynamic, self-renewing and creative 
engagement with ‘content’ or ‘curriculum’ by means of which school-goers 
are able to respond, and hence bring forth new worlds. With this conception 
of knowledge, the purpose of the curriculum is no longer to facilitate the 
acquisition of knowledge about reality. Acquisition is no longer the name of 
the game (see Biesta, 2006; Osberg & Biesta, forthcoming). This means 
questions about what to present in the curriculum and whether these things 
should be directly presented or should be represented (such that children 
may acquire knowledge of these things most efficiently or effectively) are no 
longer relevant as curricular questions. While content is important, the 
curriculum is less concerned with what content is presented and how, and 
more with the idea that content is engaged with and responded to (see 
Biesta, 2006). Here the content that is engaged is not pre-given, but 
emerges from the educative situation itself. With this conception of 
knowledge and the world, the curriculum becomes a tool for the emergence 
of new worlds rather than a tool for stabilisation and replication (Biesta, 
2006; Osberg & Biesta, forthcoming).  
 
An example of an approach which is supported by the emergentist framework 
that we have suggested in this paper can be found in Davis and Sumara’s 
‘enactivist’ or ‘complexivist’ conception of teaching, which aims to ‘expand 
the space of the possible’ (Davis & Sumara, 1997). However, while Davis and 
Sumara have certainly not ignored epistemology in their pedagogical 
formulation, their theoretical framework (drawing strongly on recent 
developments in cognitive science, artificial intelligence and second order 
cybernetics) has oriented them towards a concern with private rather than 
with public knowledge. They focus primarily on questions about teaching and 
learning without questioning the (problematic) assumption that the 
knowledge taught and learned in schools stands for something more real 
than itself. By focussing on ‘public knowledge’ in this paper, and (i) showing 
that the way in which public knowledge is thought about in schools aligns 
schooling with representational epistemology; (ii) offering an alternative 
‘emergentist’ epistemology; and (iii) showing how public knowledge can be 
understood in terms of this alternative epistemology, we believe we have 
provided a framework that could serve as a platform from which to launch a 
series of fruitful discussions between educators and educational researchers 
who are attempting to articulate an educational ethic that operates some 
distance away from the representational epistemology of schooling that 
continues to structure classroom practice in many ( Western) societies. 
 
 
 
Notes  
1. We use the popular term ‘complexity theory’ only for convenience. In fact 
ideas from complexity are too diverse to constitute a coherent theory.  
 
2. Hacking (1983, pp. 22 –23) gives the example of a super cooled niobium 
droplet, which, when ‘sprayed’ with electrons (there are standard emitters 
with which we can spray positrons and electrons) maintains an electric 
charge which can be kept going around the ball forever. This means the drop 
can be kept afloat in a magnetic field, and indeed driven back and forth by 
varying the field, and one can use a magnetometer to tell exactly where the 
drop is and how fast it is moving. Whatever ‘electrons’ are, they have real 
effects. It is from these effects that we infer their existence.  
 
3. The difference of opinion here is largely a result of different 
understandings of the notion of ‘emergence,’ which can be understood in a 
‘weak’ or deterministic sense as explicated, e.g. by Holland (1998) or in a 
‘strong,’ non-deterministic, or Prigoginian sense (see Chalmers, 2006, 
Osberg & Biesta, 2007).  
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